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bstract
This paper investigates whether product market competition acts as an external mechanism for disciplining management and also whether there
s any relationship between the degree of competition a firm faces and its corporate governance. We find that firms in competitive industries or with
ow market power tend to have weak corporate governance structures. Results are robust to various competition measures at firm and industry levels,
ven after controlling for firm-specific variables. We further find that corporate governance quality has a significant effect on performance only
hen product market competition is weak. The overall evidence suggests that product market competition has a substantial impact on corporate
overnance and that it substitutes for corporate governance quality. Finally, we provide evidence that the disciplinary force of competition on
anagement is from the fear of liquidation.
2011 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Africagrowth Institute.
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. Introduction
Since Berle and Means (1932) publish their seminal work
n the separation of ownership and control, numerous theoret-
cal and empirical works have focused on the role of corporate
overnance systems in mitigating the agency problems between
hareholders and managers. However, existing evidence has
hown that conventional corporate governance mechanisms do
ot work very effectively.4 Even with the lack of effective corpo-
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4 Allen and Gale (2000) provide a literature review of the effectiveness of
tandard corporate governance mechanisms in monitoring management and
orporate performances.
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ate governance systems, many firms still operate efficiently and
ompete effectively in global markets. Some non-profit orga-
izations in competitive industries are good examples. They
ypically have no outside shareholders and a smaller proportion
f independent directors and, as generally argued, such gov-
rnance structures tend to have lower monitoring capabilities.
hile these governance structures are typically prevalent among
on-profit organizations, they have little impact on their oper-
tional efficiency and corporate performance. Allen and Gale’s
2000) theoretical arguments suggest that standard governance
echanisms are less crucial for firms that operate in chang-
ng product market environments. The purpose of our current
tudy is to address this issue – whether a firm’s product mar-
et environment acts as an external mechanism for disciplining
anagement and ensuring corporate performance.
Theoretical models have argued that competition in product
arkets is a powerful force for overcoming the agency problem
etween shareholders and managers.5 Tough product market
ompetition forces management to improve financial perfor-
ance and to make the best decisions for the future, because
ailure to do so would possibly result in bankruptcy and job loss.
ecently, Allen and Gale (2000) formalize a model to show that
ompetition in product markets plays the role of takeovers. Well-
anaged firms take over the market from poorly managed firms.
5 See, for example, Alchian (1950), Hart (1983), Scharfstein (1988), Schmidt
1997), and Stigler (1958).
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ompetition helps reveal the best management team and disci-
line management.6 In Allen and Gale’s model, competition
cts as a substitute for external governance mechanisms, partic-
larly the market for corporate control. Their model gives rise to
everal testable implications that prompt our current study. We
nvestigate whether and how the nature of product market com-
etition acts as an external disciplinary mechanism for corporate
anagement. We also examine whether corporate governance
echanisms matter for firms that operate in a dynamic compet-
tive product market environment. Specifically, we test whether
he fear of liquidation is the channel through which the compe-
ition uses to reduce managerial slack and ensure the quality of
anagement.
For our analyses, we employ the G- and E-index proposed by
ompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009), respectively, as
roxies for the quality of corporate governance. Furthermore, we
mploy the Herfindahl index (H-index) at the industry level and
ndustry adjusted price-cost margins (IPCM) at the firm level as
easures of product market competition. The H-index indicates
he degree of concentration for an industry, while IPCM gauges
he ability of a firm to price over the cost and the dominance
f firms within industries. If a firm faces stronger competition
rom other firms within the same industry, the ability for this
rm to price over the cost is smaller. The smaller value of IPCM
mplies that a firm has a weaker market power or faces stronger
ompetition from the product market. IPCM is also a good proxy
or the fear of liquidation because firms with low market power
ave a higher probability to be liquidated. Similarly, a smaller
-index demonstrates that there are many competitive firms in
n industry.
Our study finds evidence consistent with the theoretical
rediction that competition acts as a substitute for corporate
overnance mechanisms. Firms in highly competitive indus-
ries tend to have significantly weaker corporate governance
han firms in concentrated industries. Firms with low values of
PCM are inclined to have poor-quality corporate governance
tructures. Taken together, both analyses at the industry and
rm levels suggest that the quality of corporate governance is
ot important as long as competition is strong. As theoretically
mplied, competition has a disciplinary effect on management,
uggesting that the force of discipline is from the fear of liqui-
ation since loser firms (firms with low market power or low
PCM) are likely to be driven out of business.
Our results are robust even after controlling for size, firm
alue, trading volume, return on assets, stock returns, dividend
ields, and institutional ownership. Existing studies have shown
hat firm value and corporate governance are simultaneously
etermined; we apply three-stage least squares regressions with
nstrumental variables for governance index and firm value to
gain test the relationship between competition and governance
e.g., Palia, 2001; Brick et al., 2005). Our main finding that
trong competition is associated with weak governance struc-
ures is robust across the industry and firm level analyses. When
6 Throughout the paper, we use the general term “competition¨to describe
roduct market competition.
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e substitute past firm value for current firm value to mitigate the
roblem of endogeneity, the findings remain similar. Therefore,
he effect of competition on the quality of corporate governance
s not caused by low firm value or poor operating performance.
ompetition does have an impact on corporate governance.
Finally, we show that corporate governance quality has a sig-
ificant effect on performance only when competition is weak.
ompetition alone, to some extent, may be sufficient to disci-
line management. When competition is strong, well-governed
rms do not earn higher abnormal returns than poorly governed
rms. However, good firms do perform better than bad firms in
eak-competition portfolios. Therefore, the quality of corpo-
ate governance does not add value to firm performance when
ompetition is sufficiently strong to discipline management. Our
ndings not only demonstrate that the agency problem may not
e as serious as the previous literature has suggested, but they
lso underline the importance of product market competition.
he overall evidence suggests that competition plays a substitute
ole in corporate governance mechanisms.
Our study contributes to the existing literature in three ways.
irst, we provide empirical evidence in support of related
heories that the influence of product market competition on
orporate governance does exist. While competition is widely
egarded as a good thing, there is little knowledge about the
onnection between competition and corporate governance.
ermalin (1992) uses a theoretical model to show that an
ncrease in the shareholders’ bargaining power can reduce
gency problems and make managers more sensitive to com-
etition. His argument suggests that competition complements
orporate governance. Padilla (2000) also comments that corpo-
ate governance remains important even if competition plays a
ole in corporate governance. However, Karuna (2007) demon-
trates that firms in competitive industries have a better quality
f corporate governance because of the fact that these firms have
ore power and need to be monitored. Our work differs from
ost of the previous studies in that we treat competition as a cor-
orate governance mechanism to examine the direct relationship
etween competition and corporate governance.
Second, we investigate how product market competition
ffects corporate governance and the channel which competi-
ion acts as a disciplinary tool. Guadalupe and Pérez-González
2010) find that strong competition reduces private benefits
f control. They attribute the effect of competition to both
he improvement of information transparency for firms in the
ame industry and the fear of bankruptcy. However, as dis-
ussed earlier, information available in the market reveals the
est management and that the fear of losing market share com-
els management to work hard. This, therefore, motivates us
o explore whether the information improvement or fear of
ankruptcy is the major force that disciplines management.
remers et al. (2008) also find that firms in competitive indus-
ries have poor governance quality, and they ascribe this finding
o customer relationships. Our study, however, determines the
otential driving forces behind the competition on corporate
overnance.
Third, we contribute to the policy debate about corporate
overnance. Prior studies generally investigate the problem of
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orporate governance from internal governance structures of
firm. For example, they mainly focus on board structures,
xecutive compensation, and shareholder rights. Since internal
overnance and management systems are integrated, to some
xtent, managers have power to control or maneuver gover-
ance structures to entrench themselves or gain private benefits.
herefore, some researchers provide a solution to the problem
f corporate governance through lawmaking. They argue that
well-designed law can improve corporate governance. Com-
etition may be a solution. Unlike conventional governance
echanisms, competition is an exogenous factor and provides
n effective market monitoring mechanism. Our evidence sug-
ests that competition generates a strong incentive for managers
o work diligently.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
discusses the related literature. Section 3 describes data and
ample selection. Section 4 examines the relationship between
orporate governance and product market competition, while
ection 5 looks at how corporate governance interacts with
roduct market competition. Section 6 concludes.
. Theoretical and existing evidence
.1. Theoretical considerations
How does product market competition affect the quality of
orporate governance? Allen and Gale (2000) argue that com-
etition can be an option for corporate governance; competition
an substitute for corporate governance mechanisms directly.
apanese companies are the most impressive examples that illus-
rate how intense competition produces successful companies,
uch as Toyota and Honda. The boards of directors in these
apanese companies are at least three times larger than simi-
ar companies in the United States and United Kingdom and
ave a small ratio of independent directors. Takeovers also
arely happen in the Japanese market (e.g. see Allen and Gale,
000). Conventional wisdom is that these characteristics cannot
e classified as good governance practices, because Japanese
ompanies lack supervisory mechanisms from their boards of
irectors and from the market for corporate control. However, in
eality, Japanese companies are successful and profitable. Their
roducts are the symbols of higher quality, cheaper prices, and
etter designs. Most consumers favor Japanese products and
lace them at the top of their shopping list. These are some
xamples suggesting that quality corporate governance is not
necessary component for strong performance. In other words,
roduct market competition can provide an effective monitoring
f management and is an alternative form of corporate gover-
ance mechanisms.
Another example that Allen and Gale (2000) raise to rein-
orce their points is those non-profit organizations with weak
oards that can compete with, or even beat, for-profit corpora-
ions. The successful story of the Internet browser, Firefox, is
case in point. Firefox’s parent company, Mozilla, is a public
enefit organization, which internationally unites many enthusi-
stic programmers to develop open source code applications for
ublic use. The market share of Firefox climbed from 4.22% in
p
I
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anuary 2005 to 13.38% in March 2007. Meanwhile, the market
hare of Microsoft’s Internet Explorer dropped from 85.97% in
anuary 2005 to 70.52% in March 2007 (see survey from Janco
ssociates Inc., 2007). Mozilla has no outside shareholders and
nly four people on its board of directors. This implies again
hat good governance practices do not necessarily guarantee
etter performance and competition alone can provide effective
onitoring of management.
The triumphant stories of Japanese companies and non-profit
rganizations suggest that product market competition induces
anagers to work hard. In their theoretical model, Allen and
ale (2000) argue that product market competition is used to
elect the best management team and to eliminate firms with
ad management. They presume that successful companies are
ble to control a large product market share, making it difficult
or loser companies to compete. Thus, competition acts like a
akeover, but firms take over the product market instead of other
rms. If the management does not work diligently, their compa-
ies will lose market shares and managers will eventually have
o job security. Thus, the fear of liquidation compels managers
o put forth their best efforts for their firms.
Allen and Gale (2000) assume that there are n firms in the
arket and that they choose the investment strategy k = k1, . . .,
n at date 0 to develop products. At this time, no one, including
oth investors and managements, knows the state of nature w
nd the value of product V until date 1. The value of the product
epends on both the amount of capital invested in the project
nd the quality of management. At date 1, the state of nature w
nd value of product V for the firms are realized,
(k,w) = (V1(k1, w), . . . , Vn(kn,w)).
n order to capture the whole product market, the firm with the
rst-best product will try to force the products of other firms to
e of no value for consumers. The strategy is that the best firm
ill price its product to be equal to the difference between the
alues of the first- and second-best products such that the price
f the second-best product will be exactly zero. If the second-
est firm sets the price higher than zero for its product, no one
ill want to buy its product. The price of other inferior products
n the market will be zero too. For any firm i, let
−i(k−i, w) = (V1(k1, w), . . . , Vi−1(ki−1, w),
Vi+1(ki+1, w), . . . , Vn(kn,w))
enote the vector of product values where j /= i; let
−i = (k1, . . . , ki−1, ki+1, . . . , kn)
enote the vector of investments where j /= i; and let
∗
−i(k−i, w) = max{Vj(kj, w)}
enote the highest product value in the vector of V−i(k−i, w).
s a result, the price pi(k,w) for the product of firm i should be
et toi(k,w) = max{Vi(k,w) − V ∗−i(k−i, w), 0)}, ∀i.
n this way, only the winner firm with the first-best product can
ake a profit and survive. Other firms in the same industry will
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e withdrawn from the market, because the marginal cost of
hese loser firms is greater than its marginal benefit. Since an
nferior product indicates an insufficient investment or a worse
anagement, if loser firms want to continue their business and
ecover the loss at date 1, these firms have to invest more k at
ata 1 which will reflect on the increase of the R&D ratio or to
nhance the management. This allows them to produce higher
uality products and to be able to compete again with the winner
rm at the next stage, for example date 2.
As discussed earlier, competition helps reveal good manage-
ent teams and can discipline those with poor performance.
ince the purpose of corporate governance is to ensure the man-
gement quality, competition provides almost the same function
s corporate governance does. Therefore, competition can be
onsidered as an efficient governance mechanism and can act as
substitute for traditional corporate governance structures. Our
ypotheses are as follows:
1. The source of disciplining management for product market
ompetition comes from the fear of liquidation.
2. Firms in competitive industries or with low market power
ave weaker corporate governance structures.
3. Competitive industries and firms with lower market power
ave higher R&D ratios.
Allen and Gale (2000) further suggest that the importance
f agency cost is over-emphasized. Executives in the United
tates put tremendous efforts into their jobs. In fact, they act
ike entrepreneurs. Managers always try their best to identify
nvestment opportunities and to develop good products in order
o make their companies grow, even though there are some
onflict of interests between shareholders and management.
hareholders may not know better than their management about
he industry and product market. If competition can be a gov-
rnance mechanism, the quality of corporate governance is less
mportant as long as the product market is competitive.
Padilla (2000), however, points out that competition may not
e the one and only solution to solve the problem of misman-
gement, implying that better governance structures still have
n effect on management, even under intense product market
ompetition. If competition cannot effectively substitute for cor-
orate governance, we expect that poorly governed firms would
till perform worse than well-governed firms, even though the
roduct market is competitive. We test the null hypotheses in
ine with Allen and Gale’s (2000) argument that
4. There is no significant difference in abnormal returns
etween good and poor governance portfolios when the product
arket competition is strong.
.2. Related empirical literature
Although many researchers argue that competition can
mprove performance and monitor management, there are not
any papers providing empirical evidence to show that such
irect effects exist. Nickell (1996) demonstrates that product
arket competition improves productivity growth, while Hou
s
W
r
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nd Robinson (2006) show that competitive industries earn
igher returns, compared to concentrated industries. Johnson
t al. (2009) find that the distribution of shareholder rights differs
rom industry to industry, with some industries having stronger
ights than others. After controlling for industry effects, firms
ith stronger shareholder rights earn no abnormal returns than
rms with weaker rights. The results are still consistent when the
ntrenchment index from Bebchuk et al. (2009) is used to mea-
ure the quality of corporate governance. Therefore, industry
haracteristics do matter for the quality of corporate governance.
Karuna (2007) measures competition at the industry level and
nds that firms in competitive industries have better corporate
overnance structures. He argues that managers in competitive
ndustries have discretionary powers over deciding the effective
trategies for the company. Therefore, these managers have to be
ell monitored. However, Cremers et al. (2008) find that firms
n competitive industries have weaker shareholder rights, and
hey contend that the industry effect on corporate governance is
aused by long-term customer relationships. If service providers
re taken over by another firm, customers often suffer from
witching service providers. This is especially evident in com-
etitive industries in which firms have long-term relationships
ith their customers. Thus, these firms increase shareholder pro-
isions that restrict shareholder rights to alleviate customers’
urvival concern. While these two studies are closely related to
ur work, we examine whether and how competition influences
orporate governance and particularly, we explore how compe-
ition interacts with firm value and performance to affect the
uality of governance structures.
A somewhat related study is by Guadalupe and Pérez-
onzález (2010) who provide indirect evidence that industry
haracteristics affect the quality of corporate governance. Using
ublicly traded data in 19 countries, their study shows that
he higher degree of competition is associated with the lower
egree of private benefits of control. Thus, when a domestic
ndustry faces strong competition from the international mar-
et, managers and owners in the industry receive fewer private
enefits from controlling their companies. The reduced bene-
ts are generally considered as a signal of good governance
tructures in corporate governance-related literature. The evi-
ence implies that competition improves corporate governance.
urthermore, Guadalupe and Pérez-González conclude that the
ffect of competition on corporate governance comes from both
he improvement of information transparency for firms in the
ame industry and the fear of bankruptcy among top executives.
hese are two major explanations offered in previous litera-
ure as to how product market competition affects corporate
overnance. However, no study to date provides convincing evi-
ence that explains which of these two theories most accurately
escribes the effect of competition on management.
Our work relates to studies that link product market competi-
ion to corporate governance. We test the empirical implication
f Allen and Gale’s (2000) theoretical model that competition
erves as an external mechanism to discipline management.
e show evidence that competition can substitute for corpo-
ate governance, and that the effect of competition on corporate
overnance possibly stems from the fear of losing market share.
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1%, and IPCM-5% are 1.38, 0.33, and 0.10, respectively. It is
interesting to note that there is almost no correlation between
the IPCM and H-index at the firm level, suggesting that firms18 J. Chou et al. / Review of Deve
lthough product market competition, firm value, and firm per-
ormance individually affect corporate governance, we show that
either firm value nor firm performance is able to completely
ubsume the effect of competition on corporate governance. The
mplication is that the impact of competition on corporate gov-
rnance is not driven by firm value or firm performance. We find
hat good-quality corporate governance does not add value to
ompanies when they face intense competition from the product
arket.
. Data and sample construction
Our sample comes from three key data sources: (i) corporate
overnance rating information from the 2006 publications of
he Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and from
ebchuk’s website; (ii) accounting information from the COM-
USTAT industrial annual file; and (iii) returns data from the
RSP monthly file. The sample consists of all NYSE-, AMEX-,
nd NASDAQ-listed stocks that have complete information from
he three data sources for the period of 1990–2005.
.1. Measures of product market competition
We employ two different approaches to measure product mar-
et competition. The first measure is the Herfindahl index of
oncentration (H-index) that measures the degree of competi-
ion among firms in an industry. Holmström (1999) and Nalebuff
nd Stiglitz (1983) contend that if the number of competitors in
market increases, and if the shocks affecting each firm’s costs
re correlated, then an increase in competition would generate
dditional information that can be used to mitigate moral hazard
roblems. Increased competition as well as greater probability
f liquidation of firms can be used to discipline management
Schmidt (1997)). In both cases, the Herfindahl index measures
roduct market competition at the industry level. If there are
ore firms belonging to the same industry with each firm having
small market share, this industry is said to have a strong prod-
ct market competition. A smaller Herfindahl index implies the
xistence of many competitive firms in an industry, and a larger
erfindahl index suggests that only a few, primarily large, firms
n an industry that dominate the market.
The Herfindahl (H) index is defined as
-indexi =
J∑
j=1
s2ij,
here sij is the market share of firm j in industry i. For each year,
arket share is calculated by using a firm’s net sales divided by
otal sales in its industry. In order to reduce possible errors in
he data, we apply this calculation to each industry for each year
nd average the values of past three years to find the H-index
or an industry at the industry level analysis. Then, a firm is
ssigned the H-index of its industry to determine the intensity
f its product market competition at the firm level analysis if
he H-index is the measure of competition. Following Hou and
obinson (2006), we categorize industries using three-digit level
IC codes because this balances two problems associated with
r
nnt Finance 1 (2011) 114–130
n industry classification. First, unrelated firms are not grouped
ogether. Second, we have enough firms within each industry.
Our sample contains 357 non-regulated industries.7 There
re several reasons for excluding firms from regulated indus-
ries. One, managers in regulated industries have less incentive
o perform better because of a ratchet effect. Since outside reg-
lators determine product price or profit, managers of regulated
rms would be inclined to put forth less effort. Hence, these reg-
lated firms face different corporate governance requirements
rom investors (Meyer and Vickers, 1997). Two, regulated firms
ay have low operating costs and specific capital structures
ompared with their counterparts from other industries.
The second measure of competition is an industry-adjusted
rice-cost margin (IPCM). This measure is based on the con-
ept of the Lerner index. This index is widely employed in the
conomic literature to measure a firm’s ability to price above
ts marginal cost and therefore capture its pricing power. A firm
ith little or no pricing power would face strong competition
rom the product market and might have a greater likelihood of
oing into bankruptcy. A related firm with strong pricing power,
n the other hand, would experience little competition. A num-
er of empirical studies implement the Lerner index or a similar
ethodology to measure a firm’s fear of bankruptcy or product
arket competition (see, for example, Nickell, 1996; Funk and
anzenried, 2003; Gaspar and Massa, 2006). Thus, IPCM is
good proxy for product market competition at the firm level.
he lower a firm’s IPCM, the higher is its degree of competition
rom the product market.
A firm’s price-cost margin (PCM) is defined as
CMi = profitit
salesit
,
here profit is calculated as sales minus the sum of the cost
f goods sold and selling, general and administrative expenses.
f there is any missing value, the operating income is used to
easure profit. A firm’s IPCM is then determined by subtracting
he industry average PCM from its PCM, where industries are
ased on a 3-digit SIC classification.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of our sample. Panel A of
he table shows the distribution of the two competition measures:
he H-index and IPCM. The H-index varies from 0.01 to 1, with
mean of 0.55, and the IPCM is between −464.3 and 93.46
ith a mean of 1.64. There are some extreme outliers for the
istribution of IPCMs, so we use two methods to mitigate this
roblem. One, we average the IPCM values of the past three
ears (IPCM-3YR). Two, we winsorize PCMs at 1% and 5%
evels to calculate the value of IPCM for each firm (IPCM-1%
nd IPCM-5%). The resulting means for IPCM-3YR, IPCM-7 As suggested in Barclay and Smith (1995), regulated industries include
ailroads (SIC 4011), trucking (SIC 4210–4813), airline (SIC 5412), telecommu-
ications (SIC 4812 and 4813), and gas and electric utilities (SIC 4900–4939).
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Table 1
Summary statistics.
Mean SD 25% Median 75% Correlation
IPCM
H-index 3YR 1% 5%
Panel A: Product market competition measures
H-index 0.55 0.34 0.26 0.48 0.86 1.00
IPCM 3-YR 1.38 6.86 0.00 0.09 0.70 −0.06 1.00
IPCM 1% 0.33 1.10 0.00 0.09 0.41 −0.08 0.57 1.00
IPCM 5% 0.10 0.23 0.00 0.06 0.17 −0.09 0.37 0.72 1.00
Rank Index Size Asset Sales ROA Q R&D IO YLD
Panel B: Characteristics of competition-formed portfolios
H-index formed portfolios
Low 0.20 1447.02 2493.75 1506.70 0.07 1.82 0.34 0.35 0.02
2 0.49 1482.97 3719.59 1351.04 0.09 1.84 0.12 0.34 0.02
High 0.96 1368.28 2633.09 1399.34 0.08 2.12 0.17 0.30 0.03
IPCM-3YR formed portfolios
Low −0.32 3350.27 9129.66 4201.96 0.10 1.38 0.17 0.54 0.02
2 0.13 5786.49 12353.26 4128.74 0.14 1.69 0.02 0.57 0.02
High 4.34 5847.29 6323.40 2609.40 0.13 2.28 0.13 0.57 0.01
IPCM-1% formed portfolios
Low −0.15 3415.77 10205.85 4252.85 0.09 1.38 0.21 0.54 0.02
2 0.11 5612.62 11501.86 3953.06 0.13 1.66 0.02 0.56 0.02
High 1.04 5954.81 6104.05 2733.23 0.14 2.30 0.09 0.58 0.01
IPCM-5% formed portfolios
Low −0.07 3165.69 9140.69 3987.23 0.08 1.41 0.25 0.53 0.02
2 0.07 5027.08 10777.44 3979.14 0.14 1.58 0.02 0.55 0.02
High 0.32 6780.66 7209.14 2969.81 0.16 2.35 0.06 0.60 0.01
Panel A of this table provides the distribution of two product market competition measures: the Herfindahl index (H-index) of industries and industry adjusted
price-cost margin (IPCM) of firms. The H-index is given by the sum of squared market shares of all firms in an industry. Market share is the ratio of a firm’s sales to
total sales in its industry. Price-cost margin is the ratio of profit to sales, where profit is sales less the sum of cost of good sold and selling, general and administrative
expenses. If there is any missing profit value, operating income is used instead. IPCM-3YR is the three-year-moving-average of IPCM for each firm. IPCM-1% and
IPCM-5% are PCMs winsorized at 1% and 5% levels. PCMs that are larger or lower than the boundaries are assigned to the values of 99(95)% or 1(5)% in the PCM
distribution. Industries are defined using three-digit SIC codes. The correlation between competition measures is calculated at the firm level by assigning a firm’s
industry H-index to the firm. Panel B shows average values of characteristics for industries and firms grouped based on two product market competition measures.
The sample includes all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms that have complete information from CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and information on IRRC governance ratings
for the period 1990–2005. Every year industries and firms are sorted into three groups according to either the H-index or IPCM. Size is the equity value in millions
of dollars. Asset and sales are the total assets and net sales. ROA is the operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. Q is the ratio of market value
of assets to book value of assets, where the market value of assets equals book value of assets + market value of common stock – book value of common stock –
deferred taxes. R&D is the ratio of max(R&D expenditure,0) to total assets; IO is the total institutional ownership (in percent); and YLD is dividend yield which is
d re equ
c
i
p
3
c
a
i
–
t
T
s
a
t
s
o
w
E
s
m
p
p
a
g
g
3efined as the ratio of dividend to share price at fiscal year end. All variables a
ompetition.
n competitive industries do not necessarily have a low pricing
ower.
.2. Governance ratings
We employ governance ratings as a proxy for the quality of
orporate governance. Such ratings are available from IRRC,
s well as Bebchuk’s website. The IRRC governance index (G-
ndex) takes into account 24 different provisions in 5 categories
tactics for delaying hostile bidders, proxy voting rights, direc-
or/officer protection, other takeover defenses, and state laws.
he G-index of a firm varies between 0 and 24, which is con-
tructed by adding one point to every specific provision in place
nd zero otherwise. As a result, the lower a firm’s G-index score,
he higher is the quality of its corporate governance.
Bebchuk et al. (2009) argue that not all 24 governance provi-
ions, which form the G-index, are detrimental to shareholders
v
r
eal-weighted averages at the industry level when the H-index is the measure of
r firm value. Some provisions are even positively correlated
ith firm value or stock performance. Hence they construct the
-index based on six provisions – staggered boards, limits to
hareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for
ergers, supermajority requirements for charter amendments,
oison pills, and golden parachutes. They give one point to the
resence of each provision and zero otherwise and then sum
ll points up to form the E-index. Similar to the G-index, the
reater a firm’s E-index, the lower is the quality of its corporate
overnance.
.3. Control variablesDrawn from existing studies, we also control for several
ariables that may have an impact on the quality of corpo-
ate governance. They are (a) Firm size, the market value of
quity in millions, (b) Institutional ownership, the fraction of
1 lopment Finance 1 (2011) 114–130
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Table 2
Impact of competition on corporate governance structures.
Measure Competition index Low-High
Low 2 High Mean t-Stat
Panel A: G-index
H-index 9.38 9.21 9.04 0.34 7.58**
IPCM-3YR 9.40 9.38 8.84 0.56 12.34**
IPCM-1% 9.38 9.40 8.85 0.53 12.34**
IPCM-5% 9.29 9.46 8.87 0.42 9.26**
Panel B: E-index
H-index 2.60 2.60 2.35 0.25 4.83**
IPCM-3YR 2.45 2.45 2.18 0.27 12.19**
IPCM-1% 2.44 2.46 2.18 0.26 11.77**
IPCM-5% 2.42 2.47 2.19 0.23 10.57**
This table reports the equal-weighted average G- and E-index of portfolios
at the industry and firm levels. The product market competition is measured
using either the Herfindahl index (H-index) at the industry level, or the industry
adjusted price-cost margin (IPCM) at the firm level. For the industry level anal-
ysis, where industries are defined by three-digit SIC classification, all industries
are sorted yearly by the H-index into three competition portfolios. For the firm-
level analysis, all firms with the G- and E-index are sorted into three portfolios
yearly based on the firms’ IPCMs. IPCM-3YR is the three-year-moving-average
of IPCM for each firm. IPCM-1% and IPCM-5% are PCMs winsorized at 1%
and 5% levels. PCMs that are larger or lower than the boundaries are assigned to
the values of 99(95)% or 1(5)% in the PCM distribution. Each panel also reports
the difference of the average G- or E-index between low and high competition
portfolios. The sample period is from 1990 to 2005.
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hares owned by all 13F institutional investors, as of the pre-
ious calendar year-end, (c) Largest Shareholder, the fraction
f shares owned by the largest 13F institutional investors, as of
he previous calendar year-end, (d) Trading volume, the past 5-
ear average monthly trading volume divided by the number of
hares outstanding, (e) Sales Growth, the average of sales growth
ver past 5 years, (f) Past-5-year return, defined as the past 5-
ear average monthly return before fiscal year-end, (g) Tobin’s
, the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets,
here market value is calculated as the book value of assets
lus the market value of equity minus book value of common
tock and minus deferred taxes (balance sheet), (h) ROA, net
ncome divided by book value of assets and (i) Dividend Yield,
alculated as dividends divided by calendar year-end market
alue. Accounting-based control variables are calculated using
he accounting information from the fiscal year ended before
une 30 of year t− 1.
Panel B in Table 1 shows the distribution of stock charac-
eristics for industries and firms grouped by their competition
easures at the industry level (H-index) and at the firm level
IPCM). For each year t− 1, we sort industries and firms based
n the competition measures and divide them into three groups.
esults indicate that these measures do not necessarily sug-
est that firms with a low H-index would share the same firm
haracteristics as those with a low IPCM. For example, firms
n competitive industries (i.e., with low H-index) tend to have
arger market values and institutional ownership, but smaller
otal assets and lower dividend yields. On the other hand, firms
ith low market power (small IPCM) tend to have smaller mar-
et values and institutional ownership, but have larger assets
nd higher dividend yields. Firms with both low H-index and
PCM have larger sales and R&D, but smaller ROA and Tobin’s
. A high R&D ratio for competitive industries and low IPCM
rms indicate that when firms face strong competition from the
roduct market, they will invest more capital to improve their
roduct quality or production efficiency.8 This is consistent with
ur prediction that loser firms or firms facing strong competition
ill invest more capital to develop products of better quality in
rder to survive.
. The role of product market competition
In this section, we study how a firm’s corporate governance
echanism is related to competition. In particular, we explore
ow product market competition interacts with firm value and
rm performance to affect the quality of corporate governance.
.1. Competition and corporate governanceWe first examine the direct link between product market
ompetition and corporate governance. To assess the effect of
ompetition on corporate governance, we split industries or firms
8 The differences of R&D ratio between portfolios with high and low compe-
ition measures, except based on IPCM-3YR, are all significant at conventional
evels.
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aSignificance at the 10% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
nto three competition-sorted portfolios. For the industry level
nalysis, we sort all industries yearly by the H-index and divide
hem into three competition portfolios. We average G- or E-
ndex across all firms within an industry and assign the value to
his industry. Then, we pool all industries in the same portfolio
ogether across all years, and calculate the aggregate average of
he G- or E-index. The top (bottom) competition-sorted portfolio
s concentrated (competitive) industries.
Similarly, we group all firms that have a G- or E-index avail-
ble into three competition portfolios according to their IPCM
alue and rebalance the portfolios every year. We calculate the
verage G- or E-index of firms in the IPCM-formed portfolios.
irms in the portfolio with a high (low) IPCM value have a high
low) market power.
Table 2 presents the relationship between the degree of prod-
ct market competition and the quality of corporate governance,
s well as t-statistics for the difference between two extreme
ompetition-formed portfolios. The results from this table pro-
ide an overall picture that strong competition is related to weak
orporate governance structures. In Panel A, the average G-
ndex associated with competitive industries is 9.38, which is
ignificantly higher than the average G-index of concentrated
ndustries (9.04). Low-IPCM firms also have a higher average
-index (9.40) than high-IPCM firms (8.84) when we measure
ompetition by using the IPCM-3YR. The results using the other
wo IPCM measures, IPCM-1% and IPCM-5%, are substantially
imilar. Panel B shows that the results are robust when the E-
ndex is used as a proxy for corporate governance quality. The
verage E-index (2.60) of competitive industries is higher than
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Table 3
Market competition, governance structures, and the level of ownership.
Ownership G-index E-index
Competition Index Low-High Competition Index Low-High
Low 2 High Mean t-Stat Low 2 High Mean t-Stat
Panel A: H-index formed portfolios
High 9.25 9.13 8.57 0.69 4.35** 2.34 2.42 2.12 0.22 2.73**
2 9.22 9.38 8.53 0.69 4.55** 2.40 2.47 2.19 0.22 2.67**
Low 9.40 9.19 8.84 0.56 3.62** 2.50 2.39 2.14 0.36 3.16**
High-Low −0.15 −0.06 −0.27 −0.16 0.04 −0.01
t-Stat −1.52 −0.36 −1.08 −3.41** 0.49 −0.09
Panel B: IPCM-3YR formed portfolios
High 9.31 9.22 8.85 0.46 5.48** 2.46 2.46 2.23 0.23 5.68**
2 9.50 9.57 8.75 0.75 8.98** 2.55 2.55 2.20 0.35 8.71**
Low 9.42 9.44 8.84 0.58 6.94** 2.41 2.41 2.08 0.33 7.99**
High-Low −0.10 −0.23 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.15
t-Stat −1.17 −2.68** 0.21 1.20 1.38 3.79**
Panel C: IPCM-1% formed portfolios
High 9.28 9.25 8.86 0.419 4.95** 2.45 2.47 2.23 0.22 5.31**
2 9.48 9.56 8.77 0.711 8.51** 2.54 2.54 2.22 0.32 7.98**
Low 9.38 9.47 8.85 0.532 6.38** 2.41 2.42 2.06 0.35 8.55**
High-Low −0.11 −0.22 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.17
t-Stat −1.23 −2.60** 0.07 0.91 1.06 4.42**
Panel D: IPCM-5% formed portfolios
High 9.24 9.32 8.82 0.42 4.99** 2.45 2.48 2.22 0.23 5.55**
2 9.37 9.71 8.79 0.58 6.96** 2.50 2.60 2.23 0.27 6.78**
Low 9.25 9.51 8.89 0.37 4.37** 2.39 2.46 2.04 0.35 8.35**
High-Low −0.02 −0.19 −0.07 0.06 0.03 0.18
t-Stat −0.19 −2.18** −0.87 1.36 0.69 4.45**
This table presents the average G- or E-index of competition portfolios for a given category of ownership (high, 2 or low). The ownership in each firm is measured
at the last quarter of the previous year by the largest institutional ownership. When the H-index is used as a competition measure, the ownership is equally weighted
at the industry level. Otherwise, ownership is measured at the firm level. All industries or firms in each competition portfolio of Table 2 are again sorted by largest
ownership into three ownership groups to form 3 × 3 = 9 portfolios yearly. The table also reports the difference of the average G-index (and E-index) between low
a . The
*
t
f
I
a
p
s
c
d
i
a
(
I
i
c
i
w
i
s
c
s
o
p
l
n
o
W
a
l
i
t
o
o
c
t
T
e
G
tnd high competition portfolios and between high and low ownership portfolios
Significance at the 10% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
he average E-index (2.35) of concentrated industries. When we
urther assess competition at the firm level by using the three
PCM measures, low-IPCM firms consistently show a higher
verage E-index than high-IPCM firms. All differences between
ortfolios of low and high competition indexes are statistically
ignificant at the 5% level.
Next, we investigate whether competition can substitute for
orporate governance from the viewpoint of shareholders. As
ocumented in the previous literature, larger shareholders have
ncentives to monitor executives and have more power to vote
gainst management proposals that are detrimental to them
see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Gillan and Starks, 2003).
f the large shareholders perceive that competition offers an
nadequate disciplinary force, they may ensure the quality of
orporate governance by prohibiting management from increas-
ng the number of shareholder rights provisions. In this case,
e expect no significant difference in the average G- and E-
ndexes between two extreme competition portfolios given the
ame level of large institutional ownership. On the contrary, if
ompetition provides enough monitoring, the results of Table 2
hould remain unchanged, even after controlling for the degree
f large shareholder ownership.
G
a
wsample period is from 1990 to 2005.
Cremers and Nair (2005) investigate how the market for cor-
orate control interacts with internal monitoring by using the
argest institutional ownership as a proxy for the degree of inter-
al monitoring. We employ a similar methodology to measure
wnership in each firm for the last quarter of the previous year.
ithin the same competition portfolio, all industries and firms
re split into three groups according to the ownership of the
argest institutional shareholder. We expect the average G- or E-
ndex of the low competition-index portfolio to be higher than
he high competition-index portfolio within the same level of
wnership.
Table 3 depicts average G- and E-indexes of competition-
wnership portfolios with varying competition measures. It also
ontains differences of these average indexes, along with their
-statistics, between low and high competition-sorted portfolios.
he results in Panel A are consistent with Table 2. In the high-
st ownership portfolio, competitive industries have an average
-index of 9.25, compared with 8.57 for concentrated indus-
ries. For the medium or low ownership portfolio, the average
-index of competitive industries is consistently higher than the
verage G-index of concentrated industries. Using the E-index,
e again find that strong competition is associated with poor
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Table 4
Competition and corporate governance analysis at the industry level.
Variable G-index E-index
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat
Intercept 10.76 14.82** 11.23 30.81** 3.21 10.84** 3.08 19.06**
H-index −0.38 −3.25** −0.36 −15.39** −0.12 −2.23** −0.10 −5.68**
Size 0.09 0.95 0.08 2.75** −0.06 −1.43 −0.04 −2.26**
Q −0.04 −2.10** −0.19 −5.67** −0.02 −3.33** −0.07 −4.06**
Volume 0.15 0.72 −1.40 −1.97* 0.14 2.81** 0.73 2.23**
Return −10.38 −2.72** −7.00 −2.57** −1.98 −1.13 −1.88 −1.22
ROA −0.09 −0.57 −0.80 −4.13** 0.04 0.56 0.03 0.37
SGROWTH −1.61 −4.21** −1.58 −8.89** −0.17 −1.06 −0.13 −1.16
YLD −0.04 −1.59 5.58 1.52 0.01 0.93 1.04 0.95
IO 2.45 3.05** 3.02 8.58** 0.60 1.57 0.47 3.42**
LargeO −10.90 −4.77** −10.78 −10.94** −3.00 −2.75** −2.36 −3.55**
Error clustered Industry NO Industry NO
Adj. R-square 0.10 NA 0.06 NA
Observations 3783 16 3729 16
This table shows regressions results using two different approaches: (i) fixed effects regression with errors clustered at the industry level, and (ii) the Fama-MacBeth
method. The dependent variable is the average G- and E-index at the industry level. The competition index, H-index, is the Herfindahl index. Every year, industries
are grouped into three competition portfolios according to their competition index by using COMPUSTAT information in previous year. Competitive industries are
assigned value 0. Concentrated industries are assigned value 2. Other industries are assigned value 1. These portfolio values are used to substitute competition index to
run regressions. Models (1) and (2) are fixed effect regressions, whereas Models (3) and (4) are Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions. Size is log of equity value
measured in millions; Q is the ratio of market value of assets and book value of assets, where market value of assets is calculated by (book value of assets + market
value of common stock-book value of common stock-balance sheet deferred taxes); volume is the 5-year-trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding
prior to the fiscal end; return is the monthly average return over 5 years prior to the fiscal end; ROA is the operating income before depreciation divided by total
assets; SGROWTH is the average growth of sales over five fiscal years; YLD is the dividend yield which is dividend-to-share price ratio at the fiscal year end; IO is
total institutional ownership in percent from Thomson financials measured at December of year t− 1; LargeOWN is the largest institutional ownership in the firm
at December of year t− 1. All variables are equal-weighted averages at the industry level. The sample includes all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ-listed securities which
contain stock information in CRSP, sales information in COMPUSTAT industrial annual file from 1990 to 2005.
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** Significance at the 5% level.
orporate governance at various levels of the largest ownership.
ll differences are statistically significant at conventional levels.
Panels B, C, and D report the results using IPCM for the
rm-level analysis to measure competition. In each of the three
wnership categories, low-IPCM firms in general have a higher
verage G-index than high-IPCM firms. For example, the aver-
ge G-indexes for firms with low IPCM and high ownership are
.31 in Panel B, 9.28 in Panel C, and 9.24 in Panel D, which
re all higher than their counterparts with high IPCM and in the
igh ownership category. When we continue to use the E-index
s a proxy for corporate governance, low-IPCM firms still have a
igher average E-index at various levels of ownership. All aver-
ge G- and E-index differences between portfolios with low and
igh IPCM are statistically significant at the 5% level. The find-
ngs suggest that if a firm faces strong competition, institutional
nvestors will not use their voting power to improve shareholder
ights.
There is weak evidence that large institutional investors pre-
er better corporate governance. Across different H-index levels,
rms with a high institutional ownership in general have a low
-index. The same pattern also exists when using the E-index
s a proxy for corporate governance. Based on IPCM as a mea-
ure of competition, the results show some evidence that the
arge institutional shareholders are concerned about corporate
overnance. In Panel B, the average G-indexes for low- and
r
m
redium-IPCM firms at the high level of ownership are 9.31,
nd 9.22, which are lower than the averages of G-index for the
orresponding firms in other categories of ownership. However,
o similar patterns are observed when the E-index is used as a
roxy for the quality of corporate governance.
In summary, we show that strong competition is associated
ith poor quality corporate governance and that the fear of liq-
idation may be the primary force that disciplines management.
t is plausible that poor corporate governance is caused by indus-
ry characteristics other than product market competition, such
s customer relationships (e.g., Cremers et al., 2008). However,
ur overall evidence at the firm and industry levels would sug-
est that competition does play a role in the quality of corporate
overnance. Thus, we interpret that our results are more likely
o reflect the competition effect, consistent with our prediction
hat competition can be an option for governance mechanisms
nd a substitute for traditional corporate governance structures.
.2. Competition, ﬁrm characteristics, and corporate
overnanceGompers et al. (2003) find that firms with weak shareholder
ights tend to be large, and have low sales growth, poor perfor-
ance, low firm value, and high institutional ownership. Many
esearchers believe that there is a strong connection between the
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Table 5
Firm-level Herfindahl index and corporate governance.
Variable G-index E-index
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat
Intercept 8.06 21.14** 8.14 42.52** 2.74 15.52** 2.56 41.23**
H-index −0.11 −0.98 −0.12 −3.46** −0.06 −1.16 −0.07 −5.25**
Size 0.25 5.31** 0.22 14.8** −0.02 −0.84 −0.03 −7.26**
Q −0.19 −4.67** −0.16 −9.97** −0.11 −5.69** −0.11 −10.43**
Volume −2.29 −5.16** −1.89 −6.66** −1.19 −5.56** −1.45 −6.94**
Return −10.04 −3.58** −8.88 −4.13** −2.36 −1.78* −1.06 −0.88
ROA −0.99 −2.07** −1.29 −4.08** 0.05 0.23 0.13 1.37
SGROWTH −0.71 −4.12** −0.72 −10.04** −0.13 −1.60 −0.14 −6.69**
YLD 1.70 2.80** 11.92 3.55** 0.80 2.74** 5.01 3.54**
IO 1.60 5.21** 2.06 7.71** 0.77 5.09** 0.95 9.54**
Error clustered Firm NO Firm NO
R-Square 0.05 NA 0.05 NA
Observations 17975 16 17641 16
This table shows regressions results using two different approaches: (i) fixed effects regression with errors clustered at the firm level, and (ii) the Fama-MacBeth
method. The dependent variable is the G- or E-index of an individual firm. Competition index, H-index, is the Herfindahl index at the industry level. Each year
industries are grouped into three competition groups according to their H-index. The competitive portfolio of firms is assigned to value 0, the concentrated portfolio
of firms is assigned to value 2, and portfolio of firms between competitive and concentrated is assigned to value 1. These values are used to substitute competition
index and assigned to firms under the same competition portfolio to run regressions. Models (1) and (2) are fixed effect regressions, whereas Models (3) and (4) are
Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions. Size is log of equity value measured in millions; Q is the ratio of market value of assets and book value of assets, where
market value of assets is calculated by (book value of assets+market value of common stock-book value of common stock-balance sheet deferred taxes); volume is
the 5-year-trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding prior to the fiscal end; return is the monthly average return over 5 years prior to the fiscal
end; ROA is the operating income before depreciation divided by total assets; SGROWTH is the average growth of sales over five fiscal years; YLD is the dividend
yield which is dividend-to-share price ratio at the fiscal year end; IO is total institutional ownership in percent from Thomson financials measured at December of
year t− 1; LargeOWN is the largest institutional ownership in the firm at December of year t− 1. All variables are equal-weighted averages at the industry level.
The sample includes all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ-listed securities which contain stock information in CRSP, sales information in COMPUSTAT industrial annual
file from 1990 to 2005.
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with overall institutional ownership. Again, we find a robust
negative association between the H-index and corporate gov-
ernance. The coefficient of firm value remains statistically* Significance at the 10% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
uality of corporate governance and firm value and that various
rm characteristics also affect corporate governance. The results
n Table 1 show a potential relationship between strong competi-
ion and low firm value. A question arises is whether the effect of
ompetition on corporate governance are actually caused by firm
alue and other firm characteristics. To assess the robustness of
he effect of competition on the quality of corporate governance,
e regress the G- or E-index on the measures of competition and
ontrol for the factors mentioned above, including firm value,
s follows:
-index (E-index)i = α0 + β1Qi + β2H-index (IPCM)i
+β3Sizei + β4Volumei + β5Returni
+β6ROAi + β7SGROWTHi
+β8YLDi + β9IOi + β10LargeOi,
here the control variables are firm value, competition mea-
ures, firm size, trading volume, stock performance, operating
erformance, sales growth, dividend yield, institutional own-
rship, and largest shareholder. A detailed description of the
ontrol variables is contained in the data section.
Table 4 shows the regression results of the above model, with
-statistics computed based on clustered standard errors at the
rm level. Models (1) and (3) are estimated using fixed effects
s
N
tegressions, whereas Models (2) and (4) are based on the Fama-
acBeth cross-sectional regression. Our overall results confirm
negative link between the H-index and governance quality
easured by both G- and E-indexes. While the findings suggest
hat a higher firm value is related to better corporate governance,
ith the coefficients of firm value being negative and statistically
ignificant, Models (1)–(4) show that increasing competition is
ssociated with weak shareholder rights, even after controlling
or effect of firm value. Other firm performance measures, such
s ROA, return, and sales growth, bear a negative sign in the
egressions, but they are not robustly significant and do not affect
he observed relation between competition and governance.
Table 5 shows the results of firm-level pooled fixed effect
egressions with t-statistics corrected for clustered standard
rrors and of firm-level Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regres-
ions. Unlike Table 4, Table 5 excludes the largest institutional
wnership from the regression because it is highly correlated
99 The correlation between the largest ownership and overall ownership in our
ample is 0.72, inducing a collinearity problem in the estimation. Cremers and
air (2005) also document that there is a high correlation (88%) between the
otal blockholdings and largest blockholding.
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Table 6
Firm-level market power and corporate governance.
Variable G-index E-index
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat
Panel A: IPCM-5% formed portfolios
Intercept 8.08 21.72** 7.51 38.82** 2.68 15.37** 2.51 38.25**
IPCM −0.12 −1.75* −0.13 −4.59** −0.08 −2.46** −0.05 −3.18**
Size 0.29 6.07** 0.22 15.47** −0.01 −0.65 −0.03 −6.28**
Q −0.20 −5.12** −0.18 −9.08** −0.10 −5.42** −0.11 −9.38**
Volume −2.21 −4.96** −2.41 −8.96** −1.08 −5.03** −1.32 −6.64**
Return −9.76 −3.65** −10.01 −6.25** −2.47 −1.86* −1.22 −1.02
ROA −0.60 −1.26 −0.39 −1.18 0.18 0.81 0.22 2.10*
SGROWTH −0.70 −4.06** −0.06 −3.19** −0.10 −1.18 −0.11 −5.09**
YLD 1.56 2.93** 10.84 3.38** 0.77 2.83** 4.87 3.42**
IO 1.40 4.61** 2.01 7.40** 0.77 5.09** 0.95 9.73**
Error clustered Firm NO Firm NO
R-Square 0.07 NA 0.05 NA
Observations 17769 16 17638 16
Panel B: IPCM-3YR formed portfolios
Intercept 8.13 21.96** 7.55 38.11** 2.71 15.53** 2.54 38.01**
IPCM −0.12 −1.82* −0.11 −3.13** −0.06 −2.19** −0.04 −2.20**
Size 0.28 6.04** 0.22 14.90** −0.02 −0.72 −0.03 −6.69**
Q −0.20 −4.99** −0.18 −8.86** −0.10 −5.34** −0.11 −9.08**
Volume −2.17 −4.87** −2.35 −7.84** −1.07 −4.98** −1.30 −6.55**
Return −9.71 −3.63** −10.03 −6.30** −2.43 −1.83* −1.16 −0.99
ROA −0.80 −1.71* −0.56 −1.80* 0.06 0.25 0.13 1.43
SGROWTH −0.71 −4.15** −0.06 −3.25** −0.11 −1.31 −0.12 −5.61**
YLD 1.57 2.92** 11.04 3.36** 0.78 2.81** 4.94 3.46**
IO 1.38 4.57** 2.00 7.30** 0.76 5.03** 0.94 9.61**
Error clustered Firm NO Firm NO
R-Square 0.04 NA 0.05 NA
Observations 17769 16 17638 16
Panel C: IPCM-1% formed portfolios
Intercept 8.13 21.92** 7.54 38.36** 2.71 15.5** 2.53 38.04**
IPCM −0.11 −1.69* −0.11 −3.24** −0.07 −2.21** −0.05 −2.73**
Size 0.28 6.04** 0.22 14.97** −0.02 −0.71 −0.03 −6.58**
Q −0.20 −5.02** −0.18 −8.98** −0.10 −5.34** −0.11 −9.28**
Volume −2.19 −4.9** −2.38 −8.07** −1.07 −4.97** −1.30 −6.65**
Return −9.77 −3.64** −10.05 −6.27** −2.46 −1.86* −1.22 −1.04
ROA −0.75 −1.61 −0.53 −1.66 0.09 0.39 0.15 1.54
SGROWTH −0.71 −4.16** −0.06 −3.24** −0.11 −1.31 −0.12 −5.64**
YLD 1.57 2.92** 11.04 3.37** 0.78 2.82** 4.95 3.46**
IO 1.39 4.58** 2.00 7.34** 0.76 5.05** 0.94 9.67**
Error clustered Firm NO Firm NO
R-Square 0.07 NA 0.05 NA
Observations 17769 16 17638 16
This table shows regressions results using two different approaches: (i) fixed effects regression with errors clustered at the firm level, and (ii) the Fama-MacBeth
method. The dependent variable is the G- or E-index of individual firm. The competition index, IPCM, is the industry adjusted price-cost margin, where industries
are defined by using three-digit SIC classification. Firms are classified into three competition groups according to their values of IPCM each year. Firms with a high
IPCM are assigned to value 2, firms with a low IPCM are assigned to value 0, and firms between high and low IPCM are assigned to value 1. These values are used
to substitute competition index and assigned to firms under the same portfolio to run regression. Models (1) and (2) are fixed effect regressions, whereas Models
(3) and (4) are Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions. Size is log of equity value measured in millions; Q is the ratio of market value of assets and book value
of assets, where market value of assets is calculated by (book value of assets + market value of common stock-book value of common stock-balance sheet deferred
taxes); volume is the 5-year-trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding prior to the fiscal end; return is the monthly average return over 5 years
prior to the fiscal end; ROA is the operating income before depreciation divided by total assets; SGROWTH is the average growth of sales over five fiscal years; YLD
is the dividend yield which is dividend-to-share price ratio at the fiscal year end; IO is total institutional ownership in percent from Thomson financials measured
at December of year t− 1; LargeOWN is the largest institutional ownership in the firm at December of year t− 1. All variables are equal-weighted averages at
the industry level. The sample includes all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ-listed securities which contain stock information in CRSP, sales information in COMPUSTAT
industrial annual file from 1990 to 2005.* Significance at the 10% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
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governance structures and higher firm value. The coefficients ofJ. Chou et al. / Review of Deve
ignificant and negative, implying that firms with higher firm
alue have stronger shareholder rights.
We next explore whether competition affects the choice of
orporate governance by running regressions at the firm level
nd by using IPCM as a proxy for competition. Table 6 shows
he results by using G-index as a corporate governance measure
nd three different IPCMs as an intensity index of competition.
e first report the results by using IPCM-5% because it is the
ost conservative measure for competition at the firm level.10
n order to confirm our findings, we further present results with
PCM-1% and IPCM-3YR as competition measures in Panels B
nd C. In Panel A, the coefficients of the fixed effect regression
nd Fama-MacBeth regression on IPCM are −0.12 and −0.13,
nd they are negative and significant at the 10% and 5% levels,
espectively. The coefficients of IPCM in Panel B and Panel C
re again negative. These consistent findings corroborate our
onclusion that competition has a negative effect on corporate
overnance. Thus, when competition is strong, the quality of a
rm’s corporate governance is lower.
The firm level results are robust when the E-index is employed
s the proxy for the quality of corporate governance. IPCM
emains negatively associated with the E-index in Panels A, B
nd C, suggesting that greater market competition is related to
oor governance structures. Stock return, ROA, and sales growth
ave a weak correlation with the E-index. The overall results
rovide reinforcing evidence that competition has a significant
mpact on corporate governance after controlling for the effects
f various firm characteristics.
.3. Endogeneity of ﬁrm value and corporate governance
Recent studies have shown that firm value and corporate
overnance mechanisms are simultaneously determined (Palia,
001; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Brick et al., 2005). Lehn et al.
2007) further provide evidence to show that low firm value
ctually causes poor corporate governance practices. Although
he empirical evidence has been inconclusive, firm value and
orporate governance are likely to affect each other. Firms that
ave a stronger ability to compete in the product market tend
o higher value or better performance. These better perform-
ng firms could in turn have strong shareholder rights. On the
ther hand, strong corporate governance improves incentives for
anagement and the efficiency of operations. As a result, good
orporate governance may be associated with high firm value or
ood competition performance.
To address the endogeneity issue, we estimate the relations
etween competition, firm value, and corporate governance
sing a system of simultaneous equations with a three-stage
east squares (3SLS) methodology. For the regression, we need
o identify the instrumental variables that are related to corporate
overnance or firm value only, but identifying the suitable instru-
ental variables is difficult. Following the existing literature, we
10 There are some extreme outliers when we calculate PCM for each firm.
hese outliers affect the average of PCM for an industry. Therefore, the value
f IPCM for a firm may vary with different treatments of outliers.
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se a three-year-lagged Tobin’s Q to substitute for firm value
nd then re-estimate the previous results. The three-year-lagged
rm value is highly correlated with the current firm value; how-
ver, it is unlikely for the current corporate governance to affect
he three-year-lagged firm value.11 Thus, the results obtained
sing the three-year-lagged firm value in the 3SLS estimation
ffer additional evidence on the relationship between corporate
overnance and competition.
Table 7 shows the results of 3SLS Fama-MacBeth cross-
ectional regressions of governance indexes on competition
easures and control variables. For each year, we run one 3SLS
egression to obtain the coefficient estimate of each variable. The
nal coefficients for the model are the distributions of each coef-
cient for the years from 1990 through 2005. We use the total
nstitutional and the largest ownership as instrumental variables
or the G- or E-index. The reason is that institutional investors
nd large shareholders are shown to be related to the quality of
orporate governance (Gillan and Starks, 2003). Additionally,
n our sample, the correlation between institutional ownership
nd firm value is low, and the correlation between ownership
nd the G- or E-index is high, suggesting that institutional and
argest ownerships are two valid instrumental variables for the
- or E-index.
To find instrumental variables for firm value, we adopt the
ethodology of Palia (2001), who uses treasury stock (treasury),
&D ratio (R&D), and advertising expense (Adv) as instru-
ental variables for firm value. Treasury stock is the ratio of
reasury stock to book value of assets, R&D ratio is the research
nd development expenditure divided by sales, and advertis-
ng expense is the ratio of advertising expenses to book value
f assets. Higher values of R&D and Adv represent greater
pportunities for future growth, which is unlikely related to the
uality of corporate governance. The ratio of treasury stock is
upposed to be positively correlated with firm value.12 Since
OMPUSTAT has some missing values for R&D and Adv,
e add dummies for the firms that do not have values for
hese two variables. This prevents us from losing too many
bservations.
Panel A of Table 7 uses the H-index as a measure for competi-
ion, whereas Panel B employs the IPCM winsorized at 5%. The
ependent variable is a firm’s G- or E-index for Models (1) and
3), and is firm value in Models (2) and (4). The panels show cor-
oborating evidence that strong competition and low firm value
re related to a high G- or E-index. The effect of competition on
he quality of corporate governance is not caused by firm value.
he coefficients of Tobin’s Q and the H-index are consistently
egative and statistically significant. Furthermore, firms with
etter stock performance or operating performance have bettereturn, ROA, and sales growth are significantly negative, indicat-
ng that weak firm performance is associated with poor corporate
11 Lehn et al. (2007) provide evidence to show that firm value lagged up to 20
ears is still significantly associated with the current firm value.
12 For a more detailed explanation of these three instrumental variables, see
alia (2001).
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Table 7
3SLS Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of the governance index on competition measures.
Variable G-index E-index
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat
Panel A: H-index formed portfolios
Intercept 8.44 47.51** 0.88 6.50** 3.03 18.63** 0.52 4.52**
Q −0.12 −2.15** −0.23 −3.73**
Gov. Index −0.14 −14.10** −0.31 −13.63**
H-index −0.12 −2.85** 0.08 5.45** −0.10 −5.20** 0.07 4.69**
Size 0.16 10.18** 0.14 8.55** −0.06 −2.55** 0.10 6.46**
Volume −2.47 −7.88** −0.14 −0.72 0.71 1.92* −0.34 −1.69
Return −9.13 −3.70** 20.41 8.12** −2.56 −1.35 21.56 8.28**
ROA −1.48 −3.67** 4.71 22.25** 0.23 0.88 4.86 22.86**
SGROWTH −0.63 −8.69** 0.02 0.37 −0.10 −0.81 0.06 1.70
YLD 12.12 3.47** −1.63 −2.13** 1.42 1.16 −1.93 −2.82**
IO 3.00 13.49** 0.47 2.71**
LargeO −5.04 −13.41** −1.83 −12.17**
Treasury 0.82 10.75** 0.78 10.48**
R&D 7.07 8.16** 6.93 7.81**
Adv 1.41 4.83** 1.36 4.71**
R&DDum 0.05 2.02* 0.05 2.50**
ADVDum 0.00 −0.16 0.00 −0.16
Panel B: IPCM-5% formed portfolios
Intercept 8.50 49.59** 0.96 6.79** 2.71 49.99** 0.54 4.68**
Q −0.22 −2.47** −0.19 −3.35**
Gov. Index −0.15 −13.98** −0.30 −12.93**
IPCM −0.09 −2.49** 0.00 0.36 −0.06 −3.22** 0.00 −0.17
Size 0.19 13.54** 0.14 8.34** −0.06 −8.25** 0.10 6.26**
Volume −2.47 −7.34** −0.22 −1.06 −1.54 −7.36** −0.34 −1.67
Return −8.51 −3.00** 20.78 8.11** 0.12 0.08 21.60 8.33**
ROA −1.09 −2.67** 4.72 21.86** 0.47 1.81* 4.91 22.57**
SGROWTH −0.63 −7.39** −0.02 −0.34 −0.06 −2.48** 0.05 1.24
YLD 10.87 3.40** −1.55 −2.18** 4.61 3.19** −1.94 −2.78**
IO 2.77 12.98** 1.42 17.30**
LargeO −4.97 −12.29** −2.63 −16.78**
Treasury 0.81 10.72** 0.80 10.84**
R&D 6.96 8.01** 6.87 7.72**
Adv 1.36 4.55** 1.36 4.54**
R&DDum 0.06 2.40** 0.06 2.57**
ADVDum −0.01 −0.38 −0.01 −0.31
This table shows results of 3SLS Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions at the firm level. The dependent variable is the G- or E-index of an individual firm. The
H-index is the Herfindahl index at the industry level, while IPCM is the industry adjusted price-cost margin of the firm with three-digit SIC industry classification.
Firms are grouped into three competition portfolios according to their values of IPCM each year. Firms in the high IPCM portfolio are assigned to value 2, firms in
the low IPCM portfolio are assigned to value 0, and firms between high and low IPCM are assigned to value 1. Industries are also independently sorted into three
competition portfolios according to their values of H-index each year. Firms are assigned a value 0, 1, or 2 with respect to the degree of competition in the industry.
Portfolio of firms with a low H-index is assigned a value 0, portfolio of firms with a high H-index is assigned a value 2. In Panels A and B, we use the competition
indicator based on the H-index and IPCM, respectively. For each year, we use 3SLS to estimate the following simultaneous equations:
G-index (E-index)i = α1,0 + γ1,1Qi + β1,1H-index (IPCM)i + β1,2Sizei + β1,3Volumei + β1,4Returni + β1,5ROAi + β1,6SGROWTHi + β1,7YLDi
+β1,8IOi + β1,9LargeOi
Qi = α2,0 + γ2,1G-index (E-index)i + β2,1H-index (IPCM)i + β2,2Sizei + β2,3Volumei + β2,4Returni + β2,5ROAi + β2,6SGROWTHi
+β2,7YLDi + β2,8Treasuryi + β2,9R&Di + β2,10Advi + β2,11R&DDumi + β2,12ADVDumi,
where competition is either the H-index or IPCM, and the governance index is either G- or E-index. The final coefficients are the average of 3SLS regression results
year by year. In the first equation, total institutional ownership and largest institutional ownership are used as instrumental variables to proxy the G- or E-index. In
the second equation, Treasury, R&D, Advertisement, R&D dummy, and Advertisement dummy are used as instrumental variables to proxy firm value. Treasury is
the ratio of treasury stock to book value. R&D is the research and development expenses. Adv is the ratio of advertising expenses to book value. R&DDum and
ADVDum are dummies set to 1 for firms that do not have reported values on R&D expenses and advertising expenses. The dependent variables of Models (1) and
(3) are governance indexes of each firm. The dependent variables of the Models (2) and (4) are individual firm value. The sample period is from 1990 to 2005.
* Significance at the 10% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
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Table 8
Effect of firm-level competition on corporate governance with three-year lagged Tobin’s Q as firm value.
Variable G-index E-index
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat
Panel A: H-index formed portfolios
Intercept 8.03 20.94** 8.17 44.40** 2.70 15.26** 2.55 43.35**
H-index −0.11 −0.97 −0.11 −2.77** −0.06 −1.10 −0.07 −4.28**
Size 0.23 4.92** 0.21 14.30** −0.03 −1.49 −0.04 −8.87**
Q3 −0.05 −2.42** −0.17 −6.66** −0.04 −3.51** −0.09 −8.07**
Volume −2.29 −4.83** −1.49 −5.36** −1.13 −5.02** −1.27 −6.03**
Return −14.38 −5.47** −11.99 −5.86** −4.84 −3.91** −3.28 −3.02**
ROA −1.46 −3.06** −1.12 −4.90** −0.19 −0.82 0.08 0.96
SGROWTH −0.64 −3.63** −0.64 −10.43** −0.07 −0.87 −0.08 −3.30**
YLD 1.78 2.78** 11.89 3.45** 0.84 2.67** 5.13 3.48**
IO 1.61 5.21** 1.98 8.04** 0.77 5.06** 0.93 9.75**
Error clustered Firm NO Firm NO
R-Square 0.06 NA 0.04 NA
Observations 17975 16 17641 16
Panel B: IPCM-5% formed portfolios
Intercept 8.03 21.43** 7.67 44.96** 2.64 15.09** 2.50 40.47**
IPCM −0.14 −2.06** −0.10 −3.58** −0.09 −2.73** −0.05 −3.10**
Size 0.26 5.62** 0.22 15.31** −0.03 −1.26 −0.04 −7.89**
Q3 −0.05 −2.44** −0.20 −7.06** −0.04 −3.42** −0.09 −7.72**
Volume −2.20 −4.63** −1.75 −6.78** −1.01 −4.49** −1.16 −5.80**
Return −14.74 −5.86** −14.97 −7.37** −4.84 −3.91** −3.42 −3.26**
ROA −1.08 −2.29** −0.33 −1.62 −0.02 −0.09 0.17 1.69
SGROWTH −0.61 −3.47** −0.08 −3.88** −0.04 −0.45 −0.05 −2.35**
YLD 1.64 2.91** 10.72 3.34** 0.81 2.77** 4.99 3.38**
IO 1.43 4.67** 1.89 7.37** 0.78 5.07** 0.93 9.97**
Error clustered Firm NO Firm NO
R-Square 0.07 NA 0.05 NA
Observations 17769 16 17638 16
This table replicates results of Tables 5 and 6 with three-year lagged Tobin’s Q as firm value. The dependent variable is the G- or E-index for each firm. All variables
are at the firm level. See Tables 5 and 6 for the description of control variables and competition measures. Panel A shows the results replicating Table 5. Panel B
shows the results of replicating Table 6 with IPCM-5% as a measure of product market competition. Models (1) and (3) are fixed effect regressions, whereas Models
(2) and (4) are Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions. The sample period is from 1990 to 2005.
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overnance. Firms with poor governance structures are large in
ize and have higher institutional ownership.
As we discussed earlier, a potential concern about 3SLS
egressions is the problem of choosing the appropriate instru-
ental variables. To complete the analysis, we rerun the
egressions in Tables 5 and 6, and substitute three-year-lagged
obin’sQ for the firm value. If competition does have an effect on
he quality of corporate governance, and this effect is not driven
y firm value, we expect the results to be consistent with the evi-
ence that we have documented. This approach helps mitigate
he problem of determining the suitable instrumental variables.
Table 8 replicates the results of Tables 5 and 6 using a three-
ear-lagged Tobin’s Q for firm value. The evidence at both the
ndustry and firm levels confirms our findings that firms fac-
ng strong competition from other companies are inclined to
ave poor governance structures. The coefficients of compe-
ition measures and firm values are negative and statistically
ignificant. Firm performance is also negatively related to the G-
r E-index. The results based on the three-year-lagged Tobin’s
are consistent with those based on 3SLS regressions. Over-
e
e
oll, the results show that the trade-off between competition and
orporate governance is robust.
. Performance analysis
Thus far, we find convincing evidence that competition has a
irect impact on corporate governance. Specifically, competition
cts like a governance mechanism and can substitute for con-
entional corporate governance structures. One key argument
hat Allen and Gale (2000) have made is that agency problems
ave been exaggerated in the previous literature. They assert
hat managers naturally tend to work hard and efficiently for
heir companies. If competition is strong enough, conventional
overnance mechanisms are no longer needed because most
echanisms are designed to relieve the problem of agency costs.
t is, therefore, essential that we test whether good corporate gov-
rnance can still add value to firms, or if competition alone is
nough to discipline management.
This section implements Cremers and Nair’s (2005) method-
logy to explore the link between competition and corporate
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Table 9
Competition, corporate governance, and abnormal returns.
Governance G-index E-index
Low 2 High Low 2 High
Panel A: H-index formed portfolios
Good 0.87% 0.57% 0.73% 0.92% 0.44% 0.67%
2 0.88% 0.73% 0.31% 0.73% 0.52% 0.42%
Poor 0.64% 0.45% −0.23% 0.64% 0.60% 0.15%
Diff(Good,Poor) 0.23% 0.12% 0.95% 0.28% −0.16% 0.52%
t-Stat 1.35 0.42 1.82* 1.06 −0.45 1.50
Panel B: IPCM formed portfolios
Good 0.68% 0.42% 1.09% 0.50% 0.48% 1.34%
2 0.52% 0.51% 1.18% 0.54% 0.46% 0.92%
Poor 0.66% 0.32% 0.64% 0.54% 0.56% 0.33%
Diff(Good,Poor) 0.02% 0.10% 0.45% −0.04% −0.08% 1.01%
t-Stat 0.10 0.43 1.57 −0.15 −0.31 2.91**
This table reports monthly abnormal returns of nine portfolios (3 × 3) which are formed on Herfindahl index (H-index) or IPCM and corporate governance index as
well as Diff(Good,Poor) governance portfolios. Each year, all industries are sorted into 3 portfolios according the H-index or IPCM. Firms in the same competition
portfolio are divided into three governance portfolios whose G-index (E-index) is above or equal to 13 (5), between 12 and 7 (4 and 1), and below or equal to 6 (0),
respectively. Diff(Good,Poor) governance portfolio buys good governance portfolio and sell poor governance portfolio stocks. Low H-index (IPCM) portfolio and
high H-index (IPCM) portfolio indicate competitive and concentrated industries. The abnormal return is calculated by using monthly value-weighted excess return
in each portfolio and Diff(Good,Poor) governance portfolio. The sample period is from 1990 to 2005, and the abnormal returns are estimated by using the following
four-factor model.
Rt = α + β1MKTt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4MOMt + εt,
where Rt is the excess return for the portfolio at month t. MKTt, SMBt, HMLt, and MOMt are the monthly return on the market portfolio, small minus big portfolio,
high minus low portfolio, and momentum portfolio. α is the abnormal return.
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** Significance at the 5% level.
overnance. If competition can substitute for corporate gover-
ance structures when the market competition is stiff, one would
xpect no significant difference in abnormal returns between
ortfolios of companies with strong and weak shareholder rights.
e therefore examine the abnormal return of a strategy that
ongs on stocks of firms with good governance practices and
horts on stocks of firms with poor governance practices for a
iven competition intensity level.
For each year, all industries are sorted into three competition
ortfolios according to the H-index or IPCM. Firms in the same
ompetition portfolio are further divided into three categories
ased on their governance ratings with the G-index (E-index)
bove or equal to 13 (5), between 12 and 7 (4 and 1), and below
r equal to 6 (0).13 The abnormal returns are estimated by using
onthly value-weighted excess returns in each portfolio and the
ollowing four-factor model,
t = α + β1MKTt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4MOMt + εt,
here Rt is the value-weighted excess return for a portfolio at
onth t. MKTt, SMBt, HMLt and MOMt are the returns on the
arket portfolio, the small minus big portfolio, the high minus
13 Cremers and Nair (2005) relax the cutoff of the G-index for good corporate
overnance from G-index ≤ 5 to G-index ≤ 6 and for poor corporate governance
rom G-index ≥ 14 to G-index ≥ 13. This ensures that there are enough samples
n each portfolio.
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Wow book-to-market portfolio, and the momentum portfolio. α
s the abnormal return.
Panels A and B of Table 9 report monthly abnormal returns
or each portfolio as well as Diff(Good,Poor) by using the
-index and IPCM, respectively, as proxies for competition.
iff(Good,Poor) is the difference between a good governance
ortfolio and a poor governance portfolio. Results indicate that
hen competition is stiff, the quality of corporate governance
oes not have a significant effect on performance. In highly
ompetitive environments as measured by the H-index or IPCM,
ell-governed firms perform no significantly better than poorly
overned firms. Their Diff(Good,Poor) is between 0.23% and
.28% in Panel A and between −0.04% and 0.02% in Panel B.
onversely, we find some evidence in concentrated industries
hat firms with good governance earn significantly larger abnor-
al returns than their counterparts with poor governance. Using
he H-index as the competition measure, good and poor G-index
overnance portfolios generate abnormal returns of 0.73% and
0.23%, and the difference is statistically significant at the 10%
evel. Similarly, using IPCM, the difference in portfolios of firms
ith low and high E-index governance ratings is 1.01%, and is
ignificantly different from zero at the 5% level. This finding
s consistent with that of Hou and Robinson (2006), who find
ompetitive industries, measured by using the H-index, having
igher returns than concentrated industries.In summary, product market competition can serve as an
xternal governance mechanism to discipline management.
hen competition is tough enough to discipline management,
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he quality of corporate governance does not add value to firm
erformance. Competition, to some extent, could be a substitute
or corporate governance. Hence, our findings suggest that the
revious literature might have overstated the agency problem.
. Conclusion
This study provides empirical evidence that product market
ompetition can be a governance mechanism. Specifically, we
ake the view of Allen and Gale (2000) that competition plays
he role of takeovers. Firms with stronger management take con-
rol of the product market, and leave a much smaller share of
he market for loser firms. Therefore, competition helps reveal
he best management team and discipline the management with
eaker performance. We investigate whether and how the nature
f product market competition acts as an external disciplinary
echanism for corporate management and whether competi-
ion can be a substitute for corporate governance. Moreover, we
xamine whether the fear of liquidation is the driving force that
nduces firm managers to work harder.
To explore the link between product market competition and
orporate governance, we construct two different competition
ndexes and conduct the test at the industry and firm levels. For
he industry level analysis, we implement the H-index to mea-
ure the degree of concentration, and for the firm level analysis,
e use IPCM to assess the market power of a firm and also to
easure its probability to be liquidated. We also rate the quality
f corporate governance with two different measures, G- and
-indexes.
The results show that product market competition is nega-
ively related to corporate governance – strong competition is
ssociated with poor corporate governance. Our findings are
obust to the different competition measures employed, even
fter controlling for firm value, firm size, stock returns, operat-
ng performance, and institutional ownership. The implication
s that competition does not affect corporate governance through
rm value or firm performance. To circumvent the possible
roblem of endogeneity between corporate governance and firm
alue, We also implement the three-stage least squares regres-
ions to reexamine the relationship between competition and
orporate governance. The link between strong product market
ompetition and poor corporate governance remains statistically
ignificant at conventional levels.
Finally, we find that well-governed firms earn no signifi-
antly higher abnormal returns than poorly governed firms under
ntense product market competition. However, good firms do
erform better than bad firms in a less competitive environment.
hese findings not only suggest that agency problems may not
e as serious as what the previous literature has implied, but also
trengthen the importance of product market competition. The
verall evidence suggests that competition plays a substitute role
n corporate governance mechanisms.cknowledgments
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